Fast Track Children's Hearings Pilot: Final Report of the Evaluation of the Pilot (Abridged Version) by Hill, Malcolm et al.
w w w . s c o t l a n d . g o v . u k
9 780755 946273
ISBN 0-7559-4627-8
© Crown copyright 2005
This document is also available on the Scottish Executive website:
www.scotland.gov.uk
Astron B41197 5/05
Further copies are available from
Blackwell's Bookshop
53 South Bridge
Edinburgh
EH1 1YS
Telephone orders and enquiries
0131 622 8283 or 0131 622 8258
Fax orders
0131 557 8149
Email orders
business.edinburgh@blackwell.co.uk
Fast Track Children’s Hearings Pilot
Final Report of the
Evaluation of the Pilot
 
Scottish Executive, Edinburgh 2005
Fast Track Children’s Hearings Pilot
Final Report of the
Evaluation of the Pilot
(Abridged Version)
Research Team:
Malcolm Hill, Moira Walker, Kristina Moodie, Brendan Wallace,
Jon Bannister, Furzana Khan, Gill McIvor, Andrew Kendrick
Universities of Glasgow, Stirling and Strathclyde
March 2005
© Crown copyright 2005
ISBN: 0-7559-4627-8
Scottish Executive
St Andrew’s House
Edinburgh
EH1 3DG
Produced for the Scottish Executive by Astron B41197 05-05
Published by the Scottish Executive, June, 2005
Further copies are available from
Blackwell’s Bookshop
53 South Bridge
Edinburgh
EH1 1YS
The text pages of this document are printed on recycled paper and are 100% recyclable
Acknowledgements 
 
We are very grateful to the Scottish Executive for funding this study and providing 
support throughout. The advisory group set up for this evaluation provided helpful 
guidance.  
 
We would like to thank the young people and parents who gave their consent for 
details about themselves to be used on a confidential basis for this research. 
 
The evaluation was highly dependent on a wide range of agencies and individuals for 
providing information and in many cases a considerable amount of time, for which we 
are very thankful. Central to the study was close collaboration between the research 
team and colleagues in the Scottish Children’s Reporter Administration, who have 
provided much essential help to us. Special thanks are also due to the people who 
acted as key contacts representing reporters, local authority social work, the police, 
children’s panel chairs, sheriffs and sheriff clerks. We valued very much the 
contributions made by many people to the research by giving interviews and 
completing questionnaires. Besides our key contacts, these included some young 
people and parents, reporters, children’s panel members, service providers, teachers, 
and reporter administrative staff. 
CONTENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
          Page 
 
1.  Introduction to the Fast Track pilot and evaluation    1 
              
2.  Implementation of Fast Track       5 
 
3. To what extent was Fast Track successful?    10        
 
4.  Conclusions and implications      24   
   
 
 
  1 
 1. INTRODUCTION TO THE FAST TRACK PILOT AND 
EVALUATION 
 
 
Introduction to the report 
 
This report presents key findings of the evaluation of the Fast Track children’s 
hearings pilot in Scotland1. The research was undertaken by staff at the Universities of 
Glasgow, Stirling and Strathclyde between February 2003 and January 2005.  
 
The Fast Track hearings pilot in Scotland 
 
The Scottish Executive decided that a Fast Track approach to the children’s hearings 
system would be introduced in early 2003 on a pilot basis in selected parts of 
Scotland. The aim was to improve practice and outcomes with respect to the ways that 
the hearings system and associated services dealt with young people who persistently 
offend. Particular objectives were to: 
• reduce the time taken both overall and at each stage of decision-making  
• promote more comprehensive assessments which include appraisals of offending 
risk 
• ensure that all young people who persistently offend and who require an 
appropriate programme have access to one 
• reduce re-offending rates as a result of the concerted efforts made in such cases. 
 
The reasons for targeting young people who offend persistently were that not only do 
they account for a disproportionate quantity of offences, but they were also growing 
in number by contrast with a stable pattern for infrequent offenders (SCRA 2002-3). 
Panel members and professionals involved in the children’s hearings system believed 
it worked least well for young people who offend seriously or persistently (Hallett et 
al. 1998). Also there was a strong risk of graduating to adult court (Waterhouse et al. 
2000). 
 
For the purpose of the pilot, persistent offending was defined to cover young people 
referred to the reporter on offence grounds on five or more occasions within 6 
months. It was also agreed that reporters could exercise discretion to include other 
young people under Fast Track (e.g. as a result of serious offences or to be pro-active 
where an individual appeared to be starting a persistent offending career.) 
 
Six local authorities were chosen for the Pilot, grouped into three sites: 
1. Dundee City 
2. Scottish Borders and East Lothian 
3. East, North and South Ayrshire 
 
Following a preparatory period, the pilot began in February 2003, initially for a two 
year period. Funding was provided to the Scottish Children’s Reporter Adminsitration 
(SCRA), the local authorities and police to facilitate the additional work required. The 
SCRA ‘flagged’ on its database (RAD) all cases as they qualified under the 5 offence 
                                                 
1 This is an abridged version of a longer report that is available on Scottish Executive and University of 
Glasgow web-sites. 
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referral criterion or as a result of discretion. The point at which a case was so 
designated was known as ‘entry’. It was for reporters to decide that a young person 
was no longer in Fast Track, at which point they were said to ‘exit’.  
 
The evaluation 
 
The aims of the research were stipulated by the Scottish Executive as follows: 
 
“To evaluate the effectiveness of the Fast Track hearings in processing 
persistent young offenders through the children’s hearings system more 
quickly than conventional hearings 
 
To assess how and to what extent Fast Track hearings are achieving the 
aims of  
Being better informed 
Providing better monitoring of young people 
Leading to better disposal outcomes 
 
To assess the cost effectiveness of Fast Track hearings” 
 
The Scottish Executive and research team believed it was important to include a 
comparative component in the research, so that evidence about practice, service 
provision and outcomes in the Fast Track areas could be considered in the light of 
what was happening in areas outside the pilot. It must be emphasised that it was not 
envisaged or possible to achieve precise matching of areas or cases, so any inferences 
drawn from the comparison need to be cautious. After consultation with the Executive 
and SCRA, three comparison authorities were included (Fife, Perth & Kinross and 
Renfrewshire). Individual authorities were not matched, but overall the comparison 
areas had a population only slightly lower than the pilot authorities combined, while a 
review of relevant demographic and youth crime data showed that each of the two 
types of area had similar ranges of deprivation and offending characteristics. 
 
Information at the start of the study showed that the comparison sites together handled 
about 84% of the number of offence cases dealt with by the pilot sites in total. 
However, figures that became available later showed that there was an unexpected 
divergence in offence referrals to the reporter during 2002/3,  which increased by 42% 
in the pilot areas, but by only 8% in the comparison sites. This needs to be taken into 
account when considering the study findings later.  
 
Research design 
 
The research used multiple methods and data sources to address its objectives.  
 
1. Key contact interviews 
 
Early in the study key contact people were identified in each relevant agency in the 6 
pilot and 3 comparison areas. Interviews were held with these informants usually 
face-to-face, occasionally by phone, twice or three times during the main fieldwork 
period (May 2003-July 2004). They included reporters, social work managers, 
authority children’s panel chairs, children’s hearings training organisers, police, 
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sheriffs, sheriff clerks and reporter administrative staff. They were asked to provide 
copies of policy documents and relevant statistics. In the third round of interviews, a 
standard list of issues was presented to key contacts and their responses were recorded 
on a 5-point scale.  
 
2. SCRA RAD Data  
 
Information kept on the SCRA RAD with respect to relevant fast track and 
comparison site cases was made available to the research team, subject to consent 
from young people and parents and on the understanding that all the data would be 
treated on a confidential basis. When an objection was registered, the case was not 
included. With these omissions, the remaining large majority of cases constituted the 
main sample for the study (223). There were markedly more cases from the pilot sites 
(167) than the comparison sites (56). This reflects in part the wider slowing down of 
offence referrals noted above, but also the identification of persistent offender cases 
by SCRA started slightly later in the comparison sites. 
 
3. Case questionnaire survey 
 
To obtain perspectives on individual cases, questionnaires were issued to 
professionals and decision-makers involved with the 223 cases. Reporters, social 
workers, panel members and where appropriate teachers and safeguarders took part in 
this survey, though too few were received from the last two groups to be used in the 
analysis. Most of the hearings for which questionnaires were completed were review 
hearings (over half) or continued hearings. Fewer than one in ten were initial 
hearings.  
 
 4. Cost effectiveness analysis  
 
The assessment of cost effectiveness drew on data converted from the RAD and 
certain variables from the questionnaire survey. In addition, information about the 
costs of services per case were provided by key social work contacts, usually on 10 
cases per authority. Account was taken of offending patterns before and after the 
designation of a young person as persistently offending, using standard estimates of 
the costs of crime.  
 
5. Intensive case study 
 
To understand individual cases in more depth, largely qualitative interviews took 
place shortly after attending and observing a children’s hearing, an approach that had 
worked well in a previous study of safeguarders (Hill et al 2003). It was the original 
intention to interview the young person, one or both parents, the social worker and the 
hearing chair in each case. However in some instances it was not convenient or 
possible to meet with one or more. A total of 10 hearings were studied. This part of 
the research was smaller than intended because of a change in researcher, the need to 
devote extra time to other aspects of the evaluation and cancellation of some 
appointments owing to changes in circumstances. 
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6. Service provider survey 
 
Key social work contacts in both Fast Track and comparison areas provided lists of 
the main services used for young people who persistently offend. Questionnaires were 
mailed to all the service providers listed in the nine authorities.  
 
Sample sizes are shown below with respect to sources from which the research team 
gathered information directly: 
 
Table 1.3: Samples in the study 
 
Elements of the study Types of sample Sample size 
Key contact interviews in 
pilot sites 
Reporters, social work, police, 
panel chairs and trainers 
interviewed three times each 
22 
Key contact interviews in 
pilot sites 
Sheriffs and sheriff clerks 
interviewed once or twice 
8 
Key contact interviews in 
comparison sites 
Reporters, social work, police, 
panel chairs interviewed twice 
12 
SCRA RAD data Cases from the pilot sites 167 
SCRA RAD data Cases from the comparison sites 56 
SCRA RAD data SCRA administrative staff 6 
Case questionnaire survey Questionnaire returns by reporters 151 
Case questionnaire survey Questionnaire returns by social 
workers 
111 
Case questionnaire survey Questionnaire returns by panel 
members 
142 
Cost effectiveness 
analysis 
Cases on which standard 
information on service and costs 
inputs was obtained 
84 
Service provider survey Agencies in pilot and comparison 
areas providing services for young 
people who persistently offend 
58 
Intensive case study Cases where hearings were 
observed and participants 
interviewed 
10 
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2. IMPLEMENTATION OF FAST TRACK  
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter describes: 
• how the extra funding for Fast Track was deployed  
• the number and nature of cases dealt with under Fast Track  
• some of the processes for dealing with Fast track cases 
• the nature of service inputs 
 
Expenditure on Fast Track in Context 
 
Since 2000, the Scottish Executive has provided considerable sums of money to local 
authorities for youth justice services and Restorative Justice initiatives, to supplement 
their general spending on children and families services. Both Fast track and 
comparison areas benefited from this income. The youth justice allocation for the Fast 
Track sites was about 15% greater, roughly in keeping with the difference in numbers 
of young people referred on offence grounds. 
 
The additional amount of money that the six Fast Track authorities as a whole 
received initially was nearly £5 million to cover costs for the new approach in the 
preparatory year (2002-3) and first year of implementation (2003-4). About one third 
of this was devoted to start up costs, so the planned expenditure in the first year would 
be about £3.4 million. It is important to emphasise that this was additional funding 
and was not intended to cover the full costs of dealing with all Fast Track cases. 
Existing fieldwork and residential resources, as well as education and health services, 
would still cover those cases.  
 
The funds received in  2003-4 by the pilot authorities for Fast Track and Youth 
Justice together was about three times the amount received by the Comparison sites 
for Youth Justice alone.  In the preparatory year, three quarters of the Fast track funds 
went to SCRA, but after implementation 90% went to local authorities (in effect 
social work services). In each year small amounts were allocated to the police and for 
panel member training. Much of the expenditure went on additional staff posts, 
mainly for extra reporters, social workers/youth justice workers and support staff. To 
varying degrees, money was also invested in intensive support or specialist 
programmes offered by voluntary children’s organisations and SACRO, on mentoring 
and fostering services and on purchasing specialist psychiatric input. 
 
The Fast Track local authorities had 3 organisational models for using the additional 
funding to provide assessments and supervision: 
1. youth justice workers placed in children and families teams – 4 authorities 
2. a separate youth justice team – 1 authority 
3. diffusion of case responsibility across existing children and families teams – 1 
authority 
 
Practice varied from area to area and case to case with regard to the involvement of 
the ‘original’ caseworkers. Sometimes the children and families worker withdrew, at 
least temporarily, as the youth justice (Fast Track) worker took over responsibility. In 
other instances both the youth justice worker and children and families team worker 
  6 
stayed involved, but with different roles. In some social work areas, children and 
families teams were not required to work on Fast Track cases unless they were 
specifically asked to by Fast Track social workers. 
 
The case questionnaire survey yielded information about the work context and 
experience of social workers dealing with persistent offending cases. One of the clear 
differences between the respondents in the pilot and comparison authorities was that 
in the latter group all but two worked in a Children and Families team, whilst in the 
pilot authorities 57% of respondents worked in Youth Justice and 37% in Children 
and Families teams (the remaining 6% had a specialist role). Even though the pilot 
sites had their new dedicated appointments, the workers there were more experienced 
than their counterparts in the comparison authorities. The average time in their present 
post was almost 4 years in pilot authorities, but just under 2 years in comparison sites.  
Communication and training 
 
At a national level a Fast Track implementation group was set up consisting of 
representatives of all the main stakeholders in each of the Fast Track areas and from 
the Scottish Executive. At regular meetings, experiences were shared, concerns aired 
and in the second year evidence from SCRA and the Evaluation Interim Report 
discussed. Each area also organised local inter-agency group meetings, sometimes 
with a total focus on Fast Track, sometimes to discuss wider youth justice strategies 
and issues.  
 
Training for staff and decision-makers about Fast Track was done partly in-house by 
individual agencies and in part collaboratively. Children’s Hearings trainers organised 
week-end events for panel members, to which other key agencies were invited. 
Information obtained towards the end of the research indicated that the majority of 
current panel members had received Fast Track training. For instance this was true for 
82% in one authority. It had been intended that only panel members who had attended 
the specialist training would hear Fast Track cases, but in certain areas the 
unexpectedly large number of cases at the start resulted in this requirement being 
relaxed. 
 
All except one of the 87 panel members in the pilot areas who completed case 
questionnaires had participated in initial Fast Track training. Feedback about the 
quality of training was generally very positive and the majority appeared satisfied that 
they now knew enough about Fast Track, but more than a quarter said that they would 
welcome further training. 
 
Reporter, social work and Police key contacts stated that relevant staff had all 
received adequate information or training about Fast Track. A partial exception was 
that ‘beat officers’ had not been given formal training as such but rather had been 
given a ‘brief’ about Fast Track. No sheriffs or sheriff clerks had been given any Fast 
Track training and few recalled receiving detailed information about Fast Track. 
 
Fast track and comparison cases 
 
During the first 18 months of Fast Track 307 children ‘entered’ Fast Track. There was 
an initial surge of entries to Fast Track with 56 young people included in the first 
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month, because at 1st February a number of young people already met the criteria, on 
the basis of their offending patterns in the preceding 6 months.  
 
By the end of the first 18 months, 76 young people had ‘exited’ Fast Track, leaving 
three quarters (231) still involved. The most common durations were between 7 and 
13 months, but considerable numbers were in Fast Track for periods both longer and 
shorter than this. 
 
Over the same period, 114 young people were classified as young people who 
persistently offend in the comparison sites, i.e. only a little more than a third of the 
number in the pilot sites. A small proportion of this difference can be explained by 
slight differences in the criterion (e.g. no discretionary cases). The much smaller 
number of cases and the absence of an initial surge meant that comparison sites, 
though lacking the additional resources, were subject to smaller demands. 
 
Most young people in Fast Track were in their mid-teens. 85% were boys and 15% 
were girls, which corresponds with the wider gender distribution of young people 
reported for offending.  
 
On average the number of offences committed over the period Feb. 2003 to July 2004 
by young people in Fast Track was 18.2 compared with 2.4 for other young people 
referred on offence grounds (SCRA 2005). Three types of offence accounted for over 
half of the crimes recorded for young people in the pilot. These were breach of the 
peace (20%), assault (18%) and vandalism (16%). This pattern was broadly similar to 
that for all young people, although the proportion of vandalism was somewhat lower 
and breach of the peace higher. 
 
In the year prior to being flagged as a persistent offender, that is 2002, the great 
majority of young people in both the pilot sample (86%) and comparison sample 
(80%) had been referred to the reporter for at least one offence. Many had also been 
referred on non-offence grounds (56% of the pilot sample and 41% of the comparison 
sample).  
 
In the pilot areas, 80% of persistent offending cases were referred to a hearing. This 
was a higher proportion than occurred for similar cases in the comparison areas 
(68%). The percentage of children referred to a hearing on offence grounds but who 
were not persistently offending was much lower and also the same in both pilot and 
comparison sites, namely 13%. In the majority of cases that did not go to a hearing, 
this was because compulsory measures were already in operation or because the case 
was diverted for voluntary measures (SCRA 2005). Only a few of the referrals that 
prompted entry to Fast Track went to the Sheriff for proof, but if later referrals are 
taken into consideration overall about a quarter of young people in Fast Track had at 
least one referral go to a proof hearing. 
 
The overall pattern for the living situations of young people in Fast track remained 
fairly stable over the first 18 months, but many of the individuals experienced 
changes. Four fifths were living in their family home at entry, most often in a lone 
parent household. This proportion had dropped slightly after 15 months and 
correspondingly the percentage of those living in residential or foster care rose to 
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about one quarter. However, one third had experienced a change in family carer and 
10% returned home from accommodation. 
 
Just over half the main sample were already on supervision when they entered Fast 
Track. About a third of them had ceased to be on supervision after 18 months, but a 
slightly larger number had begun supervision in the mean time. This meant that 
overall about one in five of young people did not experience supervision at all while 
in Fast Track. 
 
Family awareness of Fast Track 
Some key contacts admitted to concerns that the distinctive status of Fast Track would 
lead to stigma or resentment, but reported that experience had not borne this out. One 
reporter commented: 
 
 ‘ … we thought it would be a badge of honour but it’s not happened... Parents? In 
fact they hope Fast Track will help the young person, as other options have failed.’ 
 
In the small numbers of interviews carried out with young people and parents, most 
knew about Fast Track, though a few did not.  They usually understood that it was 
intended to shorten the gap between the offence and the hearing. Many were also 
aware of the criterion of multiple offending, e.g. 
‘Yeah I understood it: If I get hundreds of charges I get put on Fast Track.’ 
 They had little awareness of the implications for assessment and services, however. 
 
Service provision 
 
The Fast track areas invested part of their additional funding in additional 
programmes and services, but key contacts in the comparison authorities argued that 
they too had developed effective early intervention and specialist programmes, partly 
through tapping into other sources of money (such as Community Safety or the 
Changing Children’s Services Fund), as well as youth justice allocations.  
 
For the survey of services used for young people who persistently offend, the 
comparison authorities suggested considerably fewer agencies than the pilot 
authorities and the response rate was also somewhat less good. Therefore, the survey 
response came from 10 services in the comparison sites and 48 in the Fast Track sites. 
A wide range of methods was employed, but most espoused a holistic approach to 
their work with children and young people. Interestingly, the majority did not 
specialise in offending related work, although one fifth did so exclusively and a fifth 
‘mainly’. In the Fast Track areas, most providers said they did not differentiate Fast 
Track referrals from others, though several did give them greater priority or more 
intensive help. 
 
Information on service inputs to a sample of individual Fast Track cases showed that 
most often between 3 and 8 hours of community-based support was provided per 
week, of which typically between 1 and 3 hours was provided by the main social 
worker/youth justice worker. The usage of voluntary sector services ranged from three 
quarters of cases in one authority to under one fifth in two others. There was also 
considerable variation in the use for mentors, social work assistants, youth support 
  9 
workers and through care staff. Data from comparison sites suggested that the range 
in time input of community based services was similar, but use of voluntary agencies 
occurred in fewer cases.  
 
Although only a minority of young people who persistently offend were in residential 
care, the cost of this is so much higher than for community based services that this 
accounted for well over half the expenditure on individuals in Fast Track. Cost data 
were not available for education and health services, but the cost of social work 
community based services was under £200 per week in three quarters of cases, 
whereas all those in residential care cost at least £1000 per week and for one third the 
cost was over £3,000 per week. 
 
Figures for the mean expenditure on young people who persistently offend showed 
that the spending in comparison sites was rather higher on average than in Fast track 
sites, presumably in part because the absence of additional funds was offset by the 
considerably lower numbers. For those living in the community, the mean expenditure 
in comparison sites was just over £9,000 for the 12 months after the case was flagged 
for persistent offending. This compared with just over £8,000 in Fast Track areas. The 
equivalent figures for young people accommodated residentially were £96,000 in 
comparison sites and £87,000 in pilot sites. 
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3. TO WHAT EXTENT WAS FAST TRACK SUCCESSFUL? 
 
Introduction 
 
Fast track was intended to improve both the processes and outcomes of the Children’s 
Hearings system’s responses, in the following respects: 
1. Speeding up the time taken for decisions to be reached (and hence for young 
people to see the connection between their actions and the official response). 
2. Improving assessments and action plans. 
3. Guaranteeing access to suitable services. 
4. Reducing the rate of offending. 
This section considers each of these in turn, then concludes with the views of key 
participants. 
 
Timescales 
 
Standards were set for Fast Track to achieve quicker processes than hitherto (Audit 
Scotland 2002) at three stages: 
1. From police charge until the reporter receives the police report. 
2. From receipt of the police notification until the reporter decides on the 
response. 
3. If the reporter decides to call a hearing, from reporter decision to 
hearing. 
 
In other parts of Scotland including the comparison sites national standards with 
longer time-scales applied. The details are shown in Table 3.1:  
 
Table 3.1: Target time-scales for Fast Track and comparison sites (in working days) 
 
Stage Fast Track Comparison 
Delivery of police reports 10  
(for all cases) 
10  
(for 80 % cases) 
Reporter decisions 28 50 
Preparing for hearing 15 20 
 
Police officers dealing with charges do not normally know that a young person is 
formally designated in terms of Fast Track, since that designation is made later by a 
reporter. Hence the police sought to improve speed of reporting for all offences 
thought to be perpetrated by children and young people. Data provided by SCRA and 
the police forces showed that the proportion of police reports delivered within 10 days 
increased markedly in all the forces covering Fast Track areas, much less so in other 
forces. Moreover the delivery rates in the divisions dealing exclusively with Fast 
Track areas were very high (86% to 95%), though this was also true for one division 
covering a comparison site (94%).  
 
For the most part, reporters met the target of making decisions within 28 days, since 
the mean figure for all cases where a decision had been reached was 27 days. In only 
one of the 6 authorities was the mean figure over 28. In all the comparison sites it 
typically took much longer and in two of them the mean time taken was over 50 
working days. 
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Local authority Initial Assessment Reports and Social Background Reports, which are 
requested to assist reporters make their decisions about referrals, should be submitted 
within 20 days. According to the PA report (2004), which used SCRA statistics, the 
performance of Fast Track local authorities in producing social work reports within 20 
working days was much better than comparison authorities and indeed nearly all other 
Scottish authorities, though there were still quite a few ‘late’ submissions. The 
delivery of reports within this target from 49% to 100% in Fast Track areas, but 20% 
to 48% in comparison sites. Some social work key contacts in the present study 
argued that their Fast track submission rates were better than shown by SCRA data, as 
they used slightly different definitions of both what constituted relevant reports and 
the timing of delivery. Certain of the key contacts in the research from Police, 
reporters and social work suggested that electronic sharing of reports would not only 
overcome some of the practical problems of postal or personal delivery of written 
documents, but have further advantages of improved information sharing. 
 
The national standard in all hearings cases for the gap between a reporter decision and 
a hearing is 20 working days, while the Fast Track target is 15 working days. Three of 
the pilot authorities achieved the Fast Track target for persistent offending cases, as 
did one of the comparison authorities. The other three pilot authorities had averages of 
16 or 17 days, while the other two comparison sites averaged 19 and 22. Figures for 
the whole period from a reporter’s receipt of referral until a hearing (when one was 
called) showed that the mean time taken in pilot sites for persistent offending cases 
was 55 working days. This was markedly less than the averages for similar cases in 
the comparison sites (72 working days), for other offence cases in the pilot areas (71) 
and in particular for other offence cases in the comparison sites (82) (SCRA 2005).  In 
short, Fast Track cases were dealt with more quickly than others. 
 
Assessment and care plans 
 
Panel chair and reporter key contacts mostly felt that the quality and usefulness of 
social work reports had improved in the Fast Track system. Reports were considered 
to be more comprehensive, in-depth, timely, and focused, compared with previously 
or with current non-Fast Track cases.  
 
Likewise, three-quarters of reporters’ case questionnaire responses  in the Fast Track 
areas indicated improvement in the quality of social work assessment. This was not 
matched in the comparison areas, where only one in six reported an improvement. In 
the case questionnaire survey, over three quarters of panel members were well 
satisfied with the social work assessment of the young person’s needs in Fast Track 
cases. Panel members suggested that the Fast Track reports provided more detailed 
information, were more clearly focused on offending issues and able to draw upon a 
wider range of resources.  
 
Similarly favourable comments were made about higher quality action plans 
compared with pre-Fast Track practice in the majority of instances. Nearly all 
panel member questionnaires stated that action plans in Fast Track cases were at 
least adequate and many were considered very appropriate. A fifth of panel 
members in the survey thought, however, that offending behaviour was not 
sufficiently addressed.  
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Social work key respondents indicated that the capacity to deploy dedicated workers 
led to better assessments, an improved format for writing reports and a clearer focus 
in their work. For some this represented an opportunity to make a change in previous 
practice, while others regarded this as an extension of their existing approach. The 
introduction of Fast Track could also have valuable side effects in that the dedicated 
resources for Fast Track allowed other workers more time to devote to family support 
or child protection work. However, it was also pointed out that the efforts devoted to 
assessments could detract from the time available for direct work, especially in the 
early stages of Fast Track when in some areas large numbers of more comprehensive 
assessments had to be carried out over a short period. 
 
In the Fast track cases, use of a standard risk assessment form was almost universally 
achieved, as either YLS or ASSET was used in 95% of cases. The application of these 
was much less in comparison sites (one third of cases). 
 
Generally panel members said they found the risk assessments tools useful, though it 
was suggested the reasons behind the risk scores and their implications should be 
included routinely in reports to hearings.  
 
Access to services 
Key contacts in pilot areas reported that insufficient time had been allowed to set up 
some of the new services by the time Fast Track started. Therefore, sometimes the 
desired services were not available in the early stages of implementation. However, 
once these initial problems were overcome, most respondents believed that Fast Track 
ensured ready availability of appropriate services. For instance, one social work key 
contact said: 
 
Basically we have more resources for young offenders at our fingertips (now). 
We have health specialists, outreach support, psychiatric and psychological 
health support...so in general we have access to quality services and we have 
access to relevant supports. 
 
A social worker commented on a particular case that: 
 ‘We have resources available now and we didn’t have resources available 
before’.  
 
In the case questionnaires, over half the panel members in Fast Track areas thought 
that Fast Track had led to quicker access to resources and a similar number thought 
that additional resources were now available. However, others thought that the range 
of services available was still inadequate, as one panel chair remarked: 
‘Fast Track will not make any difference unless the budgets and options for 
services are there to support the system….there is still a lack of options for the 
young person.’ 
Case information revealed that the Fast Track authorities arranged for higher 
proportions of young people who persistently offend to receive additional services 
from voluntary agencies than in the comparison areas. Also twice as many attended 
standard, offence-related programmes (40% against 20%).  
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In over two-thirds of the Fast Track cases (68%), reporters’ case questionnaire 
responses stated that the range of services had increased compared to previous 
experience, which was less often the case for comparison cases (50%). There was a 
similar pattern of reported improvement in the length of time it took to access services 
in the Fast Track pilot areas: reporters felt that access was quicker in just under three-
quarter of the cases there (72%) but in only just over one-third of comparison cases 
(37%). Social workers in Fast Track areas also rated more of the interventions as 
successful than social workers in comparison sites. 
 
More general feedback on services from key contacts indicated that, in both types of 
area, most types of relevant service were seen as satisfactory or good, but Fast Track 
contacts rated more highly the availability of intensive support and mentoring. Both 
key contacts and responses from reporters, panel members and social workers on case 
questionnaires identified gaps in services, which tended to apply in all areas. These 
were: 
• Mental health services 
• Specialist day education 
• Structured leisure provision 
• Psychological services 
• Particular care placements 
• Evening and week-end support 
Offending behaviour: Fast Track cases 
 
A vital part of the evaluation was to chart changes in offending by the young people 
before and after they entered fast track, as well as parallel data for the young people 
who persistently offend in the comparison sites. 
 
The study was reliant on official records on young people’s offending. These are 
commonly used as a proxy indicator for criminal activity, but it must be borne in mind 
that such figures diverge greatly from young people’s self reports and are greatly 
affected by police detection rates and charging practices (Farrington 1992; Lloyd et al 
1994; McNeill and Batchelor 2005). Certain key contacts in two of the pilot sites 
informed us that police in their areas introduced zero tolerance policies that resulted 
in a substantial increase in charging especially of more minor offences during the 
pilot period. Others also pointed out that practice varied considerably in responding to 
incidents in residential care, which might be either treated as crimes or as domestic 
disputes not requiring a formal charge. Data provided by the police force covering one 
fast track site showed an increase in the number of charges by one third in the relevant 
division between 2002-3 and 2003-4, though there had been a similar rise in the 
division covering a comparison site. 
 
Data was readily available from SCRA about referrals to the reporter by the police, 
but this excludes information about (alleged) crimes that are referred to the Procurator 
Fiscal. This gap in information is particularly important when young people are over 
16, an age which many young people in the samples had reached or were approaching 
at the start. For some purposes, it was possible to obtain the post-16 data. 
 
The SCRA Update (2005) analysed offence-based referrals to the reporter for the 228 
young people who were in Fast Track during the first 12 months. In all, the number of 
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offences committed by these young people in the 6-months immediately after entry to 
Fast Track had reduced by over 500 (23%), compared with the period 6 months 
before entry. 11% were not referred at all in the 6-month after period and a further 
29% were referred only once or twice. 
 
For a smaller sample of 109 cases, Bradshaw (2005) compared offending patterns 
before and after a date two months after the setting of the Fast Track flag. 
Consultation with practitioners had indicated that it took on average about two months 
after flagging until direct work began with the young people, since the interim period 
was taken up with assessment and arranging hearings. 70% of the young people had a 
lower rate of offending and this resulted in a reduction by one third in the total 
number of offences in the ensuing 6 months. 13% of the young people had stopped 
offending. On the other hand one fifth increased offending.  
 
Changes in offending compared 
 
It is instructive to compare the offending trends in the Fast Track and comparison 
areas, since it might be assumed that the samples of young people who persistently 
offend were broadly similar. Certainly the case questionnaire and SCRA data 
suggested that both included similar ranges as regards previous offence referral 
patterns, broad age patterns, gender balance and living situation. However it was not 
possible to match the individuals or allow for differences in prior interventions that 
may have affected outcomes, so it cannot be firmly concluded that any differences in 
outcome were due to the differences in treatment and services. Six months after 
implementation is also a short period during which to assess service effectiveness, 
allowing little scope to assess whether reductions in offending are temporary or 
whether the benefits of interventions become more apparent in the longer term.  
 
Across evaluation samples as a whole, an analysis using both reporter referral and 
post-16 data showed that a clear majority of young people had reduced their offending 
after they were ‘flagged’. However the proportion with lower offending was higher in 
the comparison sites (81% as opposed to 69%). Similarly the mean number of 
offences per young person declined in both areas, but to a larger degree in the 
comparison sites. In the Fast Track areas the mean number of offences committed fell 
from 9.1 to 7.5 (N=167), whereas in the comparison sites the fall was from 10.7 to 5 
(N=56). In individual pilot authorities, the proportion of young people reducing 
offending ranged from 50% to 82%. In comparison authorities the range was from 
70%-91%.  
 
Within pilot sites, the highest reduction in offending occurred in the age group 12-13 
(85%) and the lowest (41%) in the 9-11 age group. In the comparison sites, all young 
people under the age of 14 had reduced their offending, 76% of those aged 14-15 and 
50% of young people aged 16+. Within both pilot and comparison sites, the 
proportion committing fewer offences in the six months after implementation 
compared with the previous six months, was greater among young people initially 
classed as high or very high level offenders.  
 
SCRA was asked to carry out an analysis to check the offending patterns identified in 
the evaluation. As data about offending after the age of 16 was not readily available, 
the analysis was done on young people aged less than 15 and under half years. Also 
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the period of 1 June 2003 to April 2004 was used, since this omitted the early Fast 
Track period when the comparison sites were not involved and allowed time to assess 
the reported number of offences before and after the case was designated as a Fast 
Track/persistent offender case. 111 Fast Track and 50 comparison site cases were 
included. Further comparable information was provided on equivalent cases for the 
whole of Scotland (N = 578). 
 
Two sets of figures were produced, one including joint referrals to the Procurator 
Fiscal and reporter and the other using only referrals to the reporter, since these result 
in different timings for the registration of referrals by SCRA. In addition, the number 
of offences was considered as well as the number of referrals. Finally, periods of 6 
month before and after were examined, first with respect to the setting of the flag and 
secondly to the presumed implementation date 61 days (2 months) later. Although the 
figures differed in detail, they were all broadly in the same direction, consistent with 
the main sample data, namely that the comparison site cases had larger reductions in 
offending than the Fast Track cases. Moreover the comparison sites were performing 
better than the Scotland as a whole, while Fast Track areas collectively were not. This 
is illustrated in Table 3.2 
 
Table 3.2: Comparison of changes in offending 
before and after the qualification as ‘persistent offender’ 
 
 
TYPE OF CHANGE  
Fast Track 
cases 
N = 111 
Comparison 
site cases 
N = 50 
All of Scotland
 
N = 578 
Number of offences 6 months 
before and after 
‘Implementation’ 
Down 32% Down  55% Down  42% 
Number of offence referrals 6 
months before and after 
Down  32% Down 54% Down  41% 
 
In the three comparison authorities the reductions in offences ranged from 45% to 
70% and all were greater than the fast track authorities (14% to 44%). 
 
One Fast Track authority provided information that showed a marked drop in 2004 
(compared with the two previous years) of the number of court reports required for 
young people aged 16-17 and in the percentage of these that resulted in custody. This 
suggests long run gains as regards involvement in the Criminal Justice System, which 
were attributed to the youth justice work carried out locally, including Fast Track. 
 
Cost-effectiveness  
 
An important component of the evaluation was to carry out a cost effectiveness 
analysis. This involved relating data about service inputs (expenditure of money and 
staff time) to outcomes and their costs. The main outcome indicator used was the 
incidence of offending 6 months after the ‘implementation’ of Fast track compared 
with the previous 6 months and the equivalent changes in offending for comparison 
site cases. The analysis was constrained by timing issues (the study started at the 
beginning of implementation and could not gather pre-Fast Track cost figures) and 
data limitations (information about inputs was partial and varied in format).  
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Social work contacts in both Fast Track and comparison sites provided information on 
a sample of cases about the financial cost or time input of staff from their own or 
voluntary services, including residential and foster care provision. Educational and 
health service input had to be disregarded as details were not available. The analysis 
included used an estimate of the costs entailed in responding to youth crime. No 
figures were available from the Scottish context, so an estimate based on the English 
system was utilised (ITV Telethon/Prince’s Trust 1997) adjusted by the HM Treasury 
GDP deflator index. This probably over estimated costs since the Children’s Hearings 
system is cheaper (Miller 2003). The costs of crime vary according to the type of 
offence. However, the effects of this could be discounted, as the nature of offences 
before and after implementation showed a similar range and there were also not 
significant differences in pattern between Fast Track and comparison areas.  
 
First it was calculated that the quicker time for processing cases in Fast Track areas, 
combined with the reduction in post-implementation offending, resulted in a potential 
saving of approximately £350 per case, compared with comparison sites. The 
reductions in offending in both types of area resulted in savings of youth crime costs, 
but the savings were greater in the comparison areas since the decreases in offending 
were greater. On the other hand, young people in the Comparison sub-sample 
received services of a higher financial value than those in the Fast Track sub-sample. 
 
For the Fast Track sample of young people who did not enter residential care the post-
implementation service costs were on average  £8,000 and the savings from reduced 
offending were estimated to be approximately £4,000 per case. This does not mean a 
net loss, as the pre-implementation service costs data should also be considered but 
were not available. By contrast, even disregarding pre-implementation service costs, 
the comparison authorities appeared to achieve a net saving. The post-implementation 
mean service cost was just over £9,000, while the saving from reduced offending was 
just under £20,000. On this evidence the comparison site interventions seem to have 
been considerably more effective than the Fast Track services. 
 
Other indicators of change 
 
Besides the data about offence referrals, the evaluation gathered other information 
that shed light on the effects of Fast Track.  
 
Data based on risk assessment is, by definition, not about actual criminal behaviour, 
but about the likelihood of criminal activity. Nevertheless the assessment tools have 
been based on research on populations elsewhere showing statistical associations 
between their scores and levels of crime, so they can cautiously be regarded as an 
indicator, though their value in assessing change is open to question. Scores on YLS 
or ASSET for fast track cases where at least two assessments were available showed 
that just over half (56%) stayed in the same risk category (low, medium or high), a 
third (34%) showed decreased risk and one in ten (10%) move into a higher category. 
 
Data was available from local authorities on 88 cases where a young person had 
exited Fast Track about the reason for exiting. In 70% of cases, the young person was 
reported to have improved or responded and in 10% not to have done so. In a further 
16% of cases the young person was now being dealt with by the adult criminal justice 
system.  
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Analysis by SCRA of the 231 children still in Fast Track on 31 July 2004 showed that 
two thirds had been referred on grounds other than offences since the start of Fast 
Track 18 months previously. Quite often these other referrals also related to the young 
person’s behaviour: being beyond control of a parental figure (43%), having bad 
associations or being in moral danger (27%) and drug or alcohol misuse (18%). 
However, one fifth had been victims of abuse or lack of parental care.  
 
Perceptions of the effectiveness of Fast Track 
 
Reporters, panel members and social workers were asked on questionnaires to 
comment on how effective the interventions had been in meeting objectives for the 
case under consideration. Many reporters were guarded in their ratings, with about - 
half opting for a description of ‘partly effective’(49%), nearly a third for fully 
effective (32%) and the rest doubting any positive impact. This was very similar to 
the pattern of responses in comparison areas, where reporters considered that services 
were fully effective in one quarter of cases (26%) and partly effective in just under 
three-fifths of cases (58%). Panel members in Fast Track areas described a higher 
proportion of cases as partly effective. In Fast Track areas reporters felt services were 
fully effective in improving other aspects of the young person’s life in one-fifth of 
cases and partly effective in two-thirds of cases (65%).  
 
Panel members indicated on case questionnaires that inclusion in the Fast Track pilot 
had had a positive impact in about half the cases and a mixed impact in a further 
quarter. Among the more positive comments were: 
 “Offending has reduced considerably and the young person has begun to 
take action on responsibility for himself, his actions and his future.” 
 
 “A big change in this young man. In his words ‘he’s getting his head 
together’.” 
 
Others observed that the young person had failed to engage with Fast Track, though it 
should be remembered that quite likely such young people would not have engaged 
with plans even if Fast Track had not been introduced: 
 “Young person did not attend regularly or keep appointments. He did not 
engage.” 
 
Social workers were asked to rate how effective the work described in the case 
questionnaires had been in helping young people address their difficulties. Overall, 
social workers in the pilot authorities rated a higher proportion than in comparison 
areas as effective or very effective (52% compared with 35%). Social workers also 
specified which services they thought had been most effective in reducing offending 
as follows: 
• offending specific work (28%) 
• changes in care placement or the support of carers (20%) 
• generally supportive relationships with workers in projects (15%);  
• a good experience in school or work (12%);  
• drug related services (10%).  
A very similar range of services were mentioned as helping improve other aspects of 
young people’s lives, indicating the inter-relationship between these and offending. 
For a number of young people, progress was not attributed to any service, but to 
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significant life changes, such as a partner’s pregnancy or obtaining employment. 
Those developments had provided a new focus and dramatically changed how young 
people spent their spare time and the company they kept.  
 
Social work comments on how Fast Track had made a difference include the 
following:  
 ‘Access to residential school has been quicker which in this case was 
appropriate and good for the child’ 
 
 ‘A. has benefited from opportunities made available to him, this indicated by a 
reduction in offending and remaining in mainstream school’ 
 
Others described a better service on offer but limitations in the young person’s 
response or further resources required: 
‘More resources available to D. (though not always welcomed by the young 
person)’ 
 
 ‘Priority access to [two intensive support services] but benefits were not 
sustained because of delay in accessing close support residential provision’ 
 
Responses from comparison sites also identified a wide and similar range of services 
as particularly effective. These included: work on offending behaviour; care 
placements, including foster care and secure accommodation; specialist day 
education; flexible support and work on interpersonal issues within the family.  
 
The small number of young people and parents interviewed in the study were usually 
satisfied with the service and in the few instances where they expressed negative 
views about the intervention, this was unrelated to Fast Track. The majority claimed 
that it was helping them cut down on their offending, though a few disagreed. One 
young person said: 
 ‘It’s better now because before I was getting into trouble. Every day I was 
committing offences.’  
 
Participants’ Views of Fast Track 
 
Nearly all key contact respondents in the pilot areas saw considerable advantages in 
the Fast Track system, often stating that, if operated properly, this was the way the 
children’s hearing system was meant to be. When asked to provide reasons as to why 
they thought Fast Track was a positive innovation, interviewees tended to stress two 
core features of the initiative, firstly, the added resources made available and, 
secondly, the ‘quicker’ time scales. As noted above, many believed this had been 
instrumental in reducing offending. 
 
The extra staff appointed as a result of Fast Track was seen by some informants, 
including panel chairs, as vital to ensure that there were sufficient social work staff 
recruited and retained to carry out assessments and report writing efficiently. The 
benefits were emphasised in the following remarks by service providers in Fast track 
areas: 
 ‘Quick referrals to reporter aids young people having to take more 
responsibility for their actions.’ 
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 ‘Process quickly, more services. Action plans being implemented’.  
 
 ‘The main advantage is the employment of specialist Fast Track workers who 
can employ the assistance of the multi-disciplinary team to assist and assess the 
needs with regard to young person’s offending behaviour.’ 
 
Similarly key contacts favoured quick action, which was thought to highlight to 
young people and parents that the matter was serious. As one reporter put it: 
It (i.e. Fast Track) is a service that responds quickly, that takes offences 
seriously, and that gives a clear message to the young person that their 
behaviour is something that needs to be addressed 
 
A panel chair said: 
I think it reinforces to children concerned the relation between cause and 
effect…a lot of the children have been around the system a long time and they 
get very fatalistic: this brings home the link between the hearing and what 
they have done.  
 
This was also said to have been a ‘knock on’ effect such that parents, too, were much 
more able to infer a ‘cause and effect’ relationship between the offence and the 
hearing. 
 
Several key contacts pointed to a synergistic effect, whereby the whole package of 
quick responses, better assessments and improved access to services combined to 
produce a generally better approach towards young offenders. Therefore 
professionals’ confidence in the system was increased and staff felt energised, which 
led to cumulative benefits at each stage of the process. These points are illustrated by 
the following comments from a reporter and panel chair: 
We can get the reports on time, we can make our decisions within the 
timescales, we get a higher quality of reports, we get an adequate assessment 
of the young person, young people are now prioritised. 
 
I think it’s a package. You can’t separate the different bits out. You have a 
guaranteed resource in 90% of cases, so panel members can make a decision 
quicker. So they are both available and they are put together.  This leads to 
better quality of decision.  
 
Diffusion of improvements into related areas of work was observed by a number of 
people. The Police generalised to all juvenile referrals their improved speed of 
providing reports. In addition, reporter, panel chairs and social work key contacts 
reported positive ‘knock on’ effects for social work practice in non-Fast Track cases. 
This resulted from staff who applied more widely what they had learned from their 
work on Fast Track cases (e.g. social workers providing clearer and more structured 
assessments and reports). 
 
A separate point was that improved work or resources with young offenders could 
assist in family support and child protection. Some social workers noted that where 
youth justice teams or specialist Fast Track social work teams had been adopted, there 
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had been a reduction of work load in existing children’s and families’ teams, freeing 
up their ability to work on family issues more readily. 
 
The reservations about Fast Track were usually secondary but nonetheless important. 
These included temporary or persisting gaps in resources, information sharing 
difficulties that particularly affected achievement of time-scales and certain negative 
consequences of focusing time and energy on Fast Track cases. Also concerns were 
expressed about particular elements of Fast Track, notably the entry and exit criteria. 
It was generally agreed that Fast Track had been introduced too quickly, so that in the 
early days staff were less well prepared than they should have been, while some 
dedicated services were not yet available nor key staff in post. In certain localities, the 
existing shortage of social workers meant that dedicated Fast Track staff were asked 
to take on full case responsibility, which they thought diluted their focus on 
offending-based work. 
 
The workload implications were often considerable of devoting much time and effort 
to produce reports and reach decisions more quickly and more often. A police 
representative pointed to overtime demands and added stress.  In one police authority 
it was noted that a backlog had accumulated in their other work because of their force 
concentrating efforts on Fast Track cases and other priority areas, though they were 
now seeking to overcome that problem. Similarly some social workers believed that 
too much emphasis was being placed on case management and meeting paperwork 
and time-scale targets, which when combined with more frequent hearings, left little 
time for intervention.  
 
On the other hand, several reported that the Fast Track emphasis on quick assessments 
meant these were not done thoroughly, especially when young people had not 
previously been known to social workers and they or their parents were reluctant to 
engage. Panel chairs, who are volunteers, experienced a significant increase in 
organisational and paper work, with little extra support. 
 
The workload implications for reporters seemed more variable. In areas with few Fast 
Track cases, the impact on their work demands was not thought to be great, but 
elsewhere they were more conscious of the extra requirements and possible negative 
side-effects: 
One of the things is that reporters are working so hard that they do not have 
time to think…reflection time is squeezed out. I think there is a huge risk that 
we become process driven and lose sight of being child centred.  
 
 
Entry criteria 
 
Respondents from all agencies, both managers and case workers, questioned the 
targeting of extra resources on the sole basis of persistence of offending. Few 
suggested that persistence should be ignored, but many wanted seriousness to be 
taken into account as well.  
 
Reporters did have discretion to include young people with one or a few serious 
offences, but it was thought by some that this should have been part of the official 
criterion. During the final stages of the research, one of the statements presented to 
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key contacts in pilot sites was ‘Reporters should have discretion to exclude from Fast 
Track young people with five offence referrals in six months when the offences are 
not serious’. Strikingly 18 out of the 19 (95%) Fast Track interviewees agreed or 
strongly agreed with the statement. As a hearing chair said: 
 ‘I think Fast Track should be concentrating on serious offenders and it’s not: 
there must be some way of sorting out ‘the wheat from the chaff’’. 
A range of people cited examples of what they saw as minor or trivial offences that 
triggered inclusion in Fast Track, when they believed it was not necessary, e.g.  
‘Stuff like littering, and kicking council trees! You wouldn’t treat adults so 
harshly for things like that, we need to discuss who we really are targeting.’ 
 
In some quarters it was also argued that younger children (under age 12) were too 
young for Fast Track. It was preferable for them to be dealt with by children and 
families teams rather than youth justice and cognitive-behavioural approaches. 
  
Offences in residential care 
 
In the first stage of this research several respondents observed that some young people 
qualified for Fast Track because of offences committed in residential care. There are 
two separate issues here. The first concerns offending away from units and schools 
committed by young people without an offending history who became involved in 
criminal activity as a result of associating with young people in residential care who 
are inclined to offend. The second issue concerns incidents within establishments, 
usually involving ‘violent’ behaviour towards staff or other residents.   
 
Key contacts referred to young people with little or no previous offending history who 
accumulated offences as a result of incidents in residential units, thereby qualifying 
for Fast Track even though their offences appeared to be very specific to their living 
situation. A few reporters thought that such offending might be compounded due to 
cramped conditions in establishments or staff difficulties in managing young people 
with a variety of different needs. No respondent felt offending in establishments 
should be ignored, but some reporters and authority panel chairs noted that there was 
a serious need for residential staff to receive training that might help to ease tensions.  
 
In the light of concerns expressed at the Interim Report stage of the research, the 
extent of this ‘problem’ was explored by Bradshaw (2005). He found that 13% of 
offences committed by young people in Fast Track prior to being flagged took place 
in a residential establishment. Many of these young people only met the entry 
criterion for Fast Track, because offences committed inside the establishment took 
them above the 5 referrals in 6 months threshold. Strikingly, over three quarters 
(86%) of those who had been living in residential establishments had such an offence. 
 
Exit criteria 
 
In the  earlier parts of the research, some respondents expressed dissatisfaction or 
uncertainty about  the basis on which young people could or did leave Fast Track. The 
Scottish Executive Guidance Booklet did not refer to an upper age limit, but described 
the two main considerations for the exit strategy as completion of programmes that 
address offending behaviour and reduction in offending episodes. Some confusion 
was expressed about how and when to judge that a young person had not responded 
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well or whether an exit should automatically result from the end of a supervision 
requirement or the young person reaching age 16 or 18. As a result of such concerns, 
changes were made to the exit criteria. In the third round of key contact interviews 
general satisfaction was expressed with the new criteria and complaints about this 
issue had largely ceased.  
 
Personal and electronic communication 
 
Interpersonal contact and communication was generally reported to be good and to 
have improved as a result of Fast Track. A number of key contacts pointed out that 
there had been improvements in inter-agency communication at local level. This 
covered strategic and managerial co-operation (mainly through joint meetings and 
agreements) as well as co-ordination and discussion on particular cases.  
 
Sharing of detailed case information across agency boundaries, especially 
electronically, was regarded as problematic. Fast Track did not cause the problems but 
highlighted them. This was apparent both from the need to achieve targets for the 
delivery of reports and from the requirements of tracking individuals’ progress over 
time, especially as regards offending. There were some differences in viewpoint about 
definitions of basic terms, such as what constituted a referral, which kinds of report 
were relevant for the timescale target and what counted as a timely or late report. 
 
Several respondents from police, social work and SCRA pointed out that some of the 
difficulties and resource demands arising from postal or personal delivery of reports 
could be overcome if there were a suitable confidentially secure e-mail connection. It 
was also recognised that information protocols had to be established which could also 
assist wider monitoring and planning. Alternatively, some interviewees suggested that 
having a central database accessible to all, with all the data on a relevant young 
person, might be a better way of organising the data. 
 
The evaluation itself, as well as attempts at local monitoring, emphasised the 
importance of being able to track young people’s offending patterns between the 
children’s hearings and adult criminal justice systems. At present, court records about 
young people are not collated in a systematic way, while the SCRA information about 
offence referrals is not directly connected to information held by the Police, 
Procurators Fiscal and Scottish Criminal Records Office about offences post-16. 
 
Links to the Court system 
 
The research team wanted to gain the viewpoints of Sheriffs and clerks, since they 
affect and are affected by Fast Track. Sheriffs have an interest in measures to tackle 
persistent offending, since if these are ineffective the young people are likely to 
appear before them from the age of 16 onward. More specifically, when cases go to 
proof for guilt to be established or not, this inevitably influences the gap between 
incident and hearing decision. Most reporters and social workers thought that proof 
hearings would have a negative impact on meeting Fast Track time scales, and that 
factors affecting these were outwith their personal control. Some had already had 
experience of this. One reporter described how some of the cases going to proof 'held 
things back by 6 weeks'. 
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Sheriffs and clerks covering all the pilot areas were invited to take part in the research 
but some declined, so only a few of each contributed their viewpoints. Most admitted 
to having little or no knowledge of Fast Track. Some indicated that they would have 
liked more information. 
 
Clerks normally tried to prioritise any child protection or offending case involving a 
child, but were under no special obligation to deal with Fast Track cases quicker. 
They were often not clear whether a case was formally Fast Tracked, so tended to 
treat all hearings cases the same as regards time-scales. Several Sheriffs and clerks 
suggested it would be helpful if reporters and Procurators Fiscal let them know which 
cases are Fast Track in order to aid prioritising of early hearing dates. 
 
Views on the future of Fast Track 
 
In the final round of key contact interviews, respondents were asked to give their 
views and advice on the question of whether Fast Track should be rolled out across 
the whole of Scotland. Interestingly, support for this was voiced not only in Fast 
Track areas, as some contacts in comparison areas also wanted Fast Track extended 
nationally. Nearly everyone from the Pilot areas was in favour of making the Fast 
Track system more widely applicable, but often this was accompanied by fears that 
this might not work well unless: 
1. a similar level of resources was provided 
2. lessons were learned from the pilot about timing and information-sharing.  
 
Respondents also urged that there be a longer preparatory period and that information-
sharing between Police, reporters and social work services be improved. It was 
suggested by a few interviewees that there might be difficulties in extending Fast 
Track nationally without some form of overall overarching body or arrangement to 
co-ordinate implementation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  24 
4. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Introduction 
 
This evaluation obtained several different kinds of information from a wide range of 
sources in order to examine the ways in which the new Fast Track approach to 
children’s hearings was put into affect and to assemble evidence about the apparent 
consequences. A multi-faceted study was necessary to reflect the reality that the 
existing children’s hearings and associated service system involves a complex and 
geographically varied set of activities across several key agencies, while Fast Track 
itself had multiple components and was introduced in six diverse authorities. These 
elements would all interact with other features of the social and policy environments 
to influence the behaviour of young people and their families in complicated ways.  
 
Information about the nature and impact of the Fast Track approach was compared 
with similar data from comparison areas. However it must be emphasised that the 
comparison areas, although chosen to have a similar spread of social 
advantage/disadvantage and youth offending patterns, could not be precisely matched 
with the Fast Track authorities. Indeed certain important differences emerged during 
the course of the study. Likewise the samples of young people who persistently offend 
in the two types of area had broadly similar ranges of key characteristics, but may also 
have differed in significant ways that were not detected in the study. Hence the 
contrasts that emerged could be related to factors other than Fast Track.  
 
Resource deployment and service development  
 
A considerable sum was provided to the pilot areas to resource Fast Track (£5 million 
over the preparatory year and the first year of implementation). Part of this was 
specifically directed at speeding up the processing and decision-making in relevant 
cases, particularly through SCRA, though also by means of Police organisational 
changes and panel member training. Part was directed at dedicated interventions, 
provided by local authorities, voluntary agencies or partnerships. A considerable 
portion was spent on additional local authority social work/youth justice staff to fulfil 
both  purposes. In all, local authorities received about three fifths of the Fast Track 
financial allocation from the Scottish Executive, which worked out at about £13,000 
per case in the first 18 months.  
 
Nearly all the spending was directed at faster assessment, communication and 
decision-making and on community based social work services with an offending 
focus. Very little was directed at education, health or residential care, yet these were 
often crucial. Firstly residential care in particular was very expensive. It was used in 
more than a quarter of the cases, yet accounted for about two thirds of all the spending 
on fast track cases, little of it derived from Fast Track funds. Very limited information 
was available about the costs of additional learning support or mental health services, 
but respondents said that their presence or absence was critical in a number of cases. 
 
The comparison authorities did not receive an additional sum, but were able to deploy 
‘routine’ services, boosted by youth justice and restorative justice funding and access 
to other sources such as community safety programmes. 
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In addition to their field social work services, more than 100 different agencies or 
projects were used by the 9 local authorities in the study. About one fifth of these 
were focused exclusively on people who offend and one fifth mainly so, with the 
majority covering a range of client groups and referral reasons. The evaluation could 
not attempt to evaluate these interventions individually, although several of the 
programmes developed under Fast Track are based on previous evidence about 
effectiveness in reducing criminal reconvictions (see e.g. Lipsey 1995). 
 
Opinions about Fast Track 
 
Key contacts in Fast Track areas generally approved of Fast Track, as indeed did most 
people in comparison sites, although some of these suggested that their own youth 
justice strategies and resources were as good. Many respondents expressed the 
opinion that ideally all children dealt with by the children’s hearings system should be 
treated with the speed and additional resourcing of Fast Track. The focus on quicker 
timescales was generally welcomed and it was felt there was a definite improvement 
in these and in youth crime rates as a result of Fast Track. A common fear was that if 
Fast Track were to be rolled out without similar levels of funding the system, it would 
no longer function properly.  
 
Most people involved with Fast Track thought that the approach was not in tension 
with the importance to addressing young people’s needs as well as deeds. Also the 
main service providers in both Fast Track and comparison sites included attention to 
non-offence related matters, even when this was a primary focus. However a minority 
did voice concerns that there was too much concentration on offending. 
 
Some respondents identified disadvantages in Fast Track. They thought it risked 
diverting resources away from other young people or was concentrating resources too 
much on ‘offence orientated’ schemes. Early on it was argued that the criteria and 
processes of exiting were too rigid, but later this issue was seen to have been largely 
sorted out. However, concern remained among a number of people that the entry 
criteria should take more account of offence seriousness as well as persistence. Nearly 
all key contacts in the Fast Track areas wanted reporters to have discretion to exclude 
from entry to Fast Track young people whose ‘persistent’ offences were not serious. 
 
Fast Track and comparison cases 
 
In the first 18 months just over 300 young people were included in Fast Track. Data 
on the comparison sites has suggested that they should have had about 20% fewer 
young people classed as ‘persistent offenders’, but in fact over the same 18-month 
period there were only a little over a third of the number in the Fast Track pilot areas 
(i.e. 114). Moreover, information that became available after the start of the study 
showed that the comparison sites collectively were experiencing a much smaller 
increase in offence referrals to the reporter than the Fast track areas as a whole (an 8% 
increase from 2001/2 to 2002/3, compared with a 42% in Fast track sites). This meant 
that the comparison authorities could concentrate resources on fewer offending cases 
generally and also on fewer cases of young people who persistently offend. That helps 
explain why, contrary to expectations, social work service expenditure on a sub-
sample of Fast Track cases was on average somewhat lower than a sub-sample of 
comparison cases. 
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On the whole, young people who had been persistently offending in the two kinds of 
areas received similar ranges of both level and type of service, although young people 
in Fast Track were more likely to be referred to a standard intensive support 
programme or be allocated a mentor. The mean expenditure per case was higher in 
comparison sites, both for young people who spent time in residential care and those 
who did not. 
 
Evidence about impact on procedures and interventions 
 
The study showed that in most respects Fast Track was largely meeting its objectives, 
except significantly when it came to offending trends.   
 
Data on the interval between key stages of decision-making showed that the speed of 
handling cases of persistent offending in the pilot areas was faster than in the 
comparison sites and, with only a few exceptions, met the targets. As police officers 
do not know in advance whether a case will be included in Fast Track, the Police set 
targets to improve the speed at which offence-based referrals were made to reporters 
for all young people under 16, i.e. not only those who were persistently offending. 
The introduction of Fast Track was accompanied by a marked improvement in the 
Police meeting of these time-scale targets (86% to 95% in the divisions covering Fast 
Track sites, much higher than in most other parts of Scotland).  
 
In five Fast Track areas reporters met their target of making a final decision as to 
whether a young person should be brought to a hearing within 28 working days. The 
sixth area had a mean time only slightly above the target. The comparison sites were 
not expected to achieve the same time-scales and two of them had mean figures for 
over 50 working days. Similarly the submission times for social work reports showed 
a big improvement compared with both previous practice and comparison sites.  
 
Nearly all respondents were supportive of the emphasis on quicker responses, but 
some representatives of each of the three main agencies suggested that at times the 
speed was detracting from quality or that other work was suffering in order not to be 
late with Fast Track cases. 
 
All the pilot authorities used a standard offending risk assessment tool, either YLS or 
ASSET. Almost all social work respondents dealing with Fast Track cases stated that 
a risk assessment tool had been used, as opposed to about one third responsible for 
comparison cases. In general panel members reported these to be a useful tool. 
 
Evidence from reporters and panel members indicated that social work assessments 
and action plans were better in Fast Track areas. A number of respondents stated that 
assessments for hearings had become more focussed and that more emphasis was 
given to offending. Action plans and service provision in the pilot authorities were 
reported to concentrate more on accommodation and living arrangements and lifestyle 
issues than in comparison sites. Panel members also reported greater confidence in 
recommended services being available, but fewer than half of action plans for Fast 
Track cases that were said by reporters to be adequately implemented. 
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Some new dedicated services funded by Fast Track were not ready at the start. 
Nevertheless, in most cases suitable services were accessed, though this was also true 
in the majority of comparison cases too. Social workers in Fast Track areas rated 
more of the interventions as successful than social workers in comparison sites. The 
main deficiencies in interventions were similar in both types of area, especially with 
regard to mental health services and additional day learning support. 
 
Interpersonal and electronic communication 
 
Interpersonal communication among agencies was usually reported to have improved 
in pilot areas, assisted by frequent and regular planning and review meetings. 
However, problems in sharing information were identified by respondents in relation 
to their own operations. This was also highlighted by the difficulties the research team 
found in obtaining certain crucial data. Of particular importance was the absence of 
secure and convenient electronic means for transferring qualitative and quantitative 
data between agencies. This affected practice with regard to the delivery of social 
work reports to reporters, which require postal or personal delivery of hard copies, 
leading in some cases to late arrival and/or disagreement about whether a report was 
received on time. Also considerable staff time was sometimes taken up in order to 
save a few hours or 1 to 2 days delay that would otherwise render the report late. In 
only about half the cases was information about the time of charges effectively 
transferred between the Police and SCRA. 
 
The study also identified  substantial issues about information at the interface between 
the children’s hearings and the adult criminal justice system. In general it appears that 
some courts do not keep or collate consistent numeric records of cases where children 
and young people offend. When cases were referred to proof, clerks and sheriffs were 
rarely knew which were included in Fast Track. Especially important with regard to 
the monitoring of offending careers is the lack of connection between SCRA data on 
re-referrals on the one hand and police and court records on the other about charges 
and convictions of young people under 18. It is recognised that these matters raise 
ethical as well as technical and inter-agency issues. 
 
The impact on young people and offending 
 
Reports from social work contacts about cases that had exited Fast Track were largely 
positive, though it must be borne in mind that young people who were thought to need 
further help to achieve or maintain gains would often not have exited. 70% of young 
people who had exited were said to have done so because they had improved or 
responded to the programme. About a quarter had not responded and/or were now 
involved in the adult criminal justice system. Just over half of the young people with 
two or more risk assessment scores had remained in the same broad grouping, while 
one third had moved to a lower risk category and 10% were not rated as higher risk 
than before. In the majority of cases in the evaluation sample, reporters and panel 
members thought the intervention had had positive results, which was true for only 
slightly smaller proportions in comparison areas. Moreover, the general view was that 
young people’s welfare needs had not suffered from a focus on offending. 
 
Official indicators showed a decrease in offending behaviour by most young people 
after they became involved in Fast Track. SCRA data showed a decline of one quarter 
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in referrals for offences in the 6 months after Fast Track designation compared with 6 
months before. This was confirmed by data for the evaluation sample, which also 
included post-16 data, though the impact was least for those at the younger end of the 
age spectrum (9-11 years). 
 
However, when the trends in the performance of the similar (but not matched) cases 
in the comparison authorities were considered, the data revealed a greater reduction in 
offending there than in Fast Track areas. Moreover each comparison authority had  a 
better record of reduced offending than all of the Fast Track areas. The findings did 
not appear to have been skewed by a small number of high offending individuals. The 
conclusion that comparison sites had a greater impact on offending should be 
qualified by noting that the period of judgement was measuring only short-term 
effects over 4-6 months. 
 
Discussion and implications 
 
The study has shown that Fast Track largely captured the hearts and minds of those 
engaged in implementing it. Also it has been successful in speeding up the time taken 
for decision-making and delivery of reports, while the quality of assessment and 
action plans had improved.  
 
Two other conclusions were less expected. Firstly social work expenditure per case 
did not appear to be greater. However, it must be borne in mind that Fast Track areas 
had to spread their resources over higher numbers of cases and in the early stages 
some interventions were not yet available. Moreover, the cost estimates were based on 
relatively crude data, omitting consideration of education, health and other costs. 
 
Secondly, the numbers of (officially recorded) offences went down, But the reduction 
was considerably less than in the comparison areas, suggesting the latter were more 
successful. When the costs of crime were taken into account, on average Fast Track 
cost more than comparison sites per young person, because the drop in offending had 
been smaller.  
 
Since the ultimate aim of Fast Track was to reduce offending more than conventional 
hearings, the meaning of the data merits exploration. Official offending data always 
bears a complex relationship to actual law-breaking activity, since it depends on a 
host of  factors including police detection rates and charging practices which vary 
over place and time (Lloyd et al 1994). The research team was not in a position to 
establish whether there were marked variations that could account for the differences 
across the two types of area. These each encompassed different divisions of three 
forces, so it might seem that an unlikely combination of circumstances would result in 
all three comparison areas having more stringent practices than all the Fast Track 
areas. On the other hand, variations were described in responses to minor offences 
and incidents in residential care, while significant changes towards charging for more 
minor offences were reported from some of the pilot divisions, so this explanation 
cannot be ruled out.  
 
Differences in the sample may also have been important – perhaps those who 
persistently offended in the comparison sites were less disposed to carry on to the 
same extent. The comparative sample did have a lower average rate of offending in 
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the 6 months prior to Fast Track, but otherwise the samples were broadly similar on 
key characteristics such as age, gender and living situation. The differences in post-
implementation offending patterns were not due to a few exceptional cases, as the 
spread of trends was similar. 
 
It is also important to recognise that within the time-scale of the evaluation it was 
possible to track offending for an adequate number of young people only over 6 
months. Most research that examines post-intervention trends considers 1 or 2 year 
periods, while arguably the eventual  extent of criminality in adulthood is a crucial 
outcome measure (Burnett and Roberts 2004). 
 
With those caveats in mind, if it is assumed that the offending data is accurate, then 
the comparison sites have been particularly successful not only in achieving longer 
term reductions in overall offending by young people, but also in the offences 
committed by those classified as persistent offenders. It will be recalled from Chapter 
1 that the comparison sites had an overall decline in their rates of referral on offence 
grounds from 2002 to 2003 much greater than in the pilot sites.  
 
This may reflect better preventive and intervention strategies set up before Fast Track, 
as some comparison area key contacts suggested. Moreover, despite not receiving the 
added resources of Fast Track, the lower numbers of persistent offending cases did 
allow for somewhat higher expenditure per case, which may also be a contributory 
factor. Those lower numbers may themselves represent a virtuous circle achieved by  
earlier investment. Also relevant may be the comments from a number of participants 
in the research, especially within social work but also reporters, that time was being 
diverted into assessments, report-writing and more frequent hearings, which meant 
less time for intervention. A few also suggested that haste in decision-making might 
have resulted in less appropriate decisions. 
 
Whatever led to the reductions in offending, the accounts given by social workers 
about the reasons for improvements in individual cases indicated that these factors 
were wide-ranging, varied according to individual circumstances and included 
external changes as well as formal interventions. In both pilot and comparison areas 
they referred to offending-related programmes (more often in Fast Track cases), 
relationship work, a change in living situation, the support of trusted people, good 
experiences of school and life events. This fits with previous evidence about the 
success of multimodal approaches, the importance of personal relationships and the 
need for time to engage with young people (Lipsey 1995; Utting and Vennard 2000), 
but highlights the difficulty of isolating simple explanations for changes across 
populations of young people.  
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Final Conclusions 
 
The Fast Track system was implemented largely as planned, although a few delays 
occurred in setting up intervention services. In retrospect, more attention could have 
been given to shortfalls in mental health and education services, while the crucial 
impact of residential care on both costs and outcomes also merits further 
consideration.  
 
The evidence indicates that the approach was clearly successful in speeding up the 
processes for dealing with and deciding about young people who persistently offend. 
In some respects the resources had led to improvements in this respect with a wider 
population of young people. Concerted efforts by Police, reporters and social workers 
all contributed to this. The quicker processing of cases in Fast Track areas should 
mean that there are savings to society from the earlier onset of reduction in offending. 
However, there is considerable scope to improve inter-agency sharing of information 
electronically. 
 
The evaluation produced mixed results with regard to the effects of Fast Track on 
young people. The majority of young people were said to have engaged well and 
feedback on cases indicated more all round improvements than in comparison sites. 
Offending by the young people in Fast Track did decrease, but the reduction in 
comparison sites was even greater. Therefore, contrary to some expectations, the cost 
effectiveness of work in the comparison sites was on average better. This might be 
accounted for by differences in the areas and samples as well as limitations in the 
data. However there is also evidence to suggest that the choice of comparison areas 
had by chance settled on locations where strategies were already producing reductions 
in offending. This in turn means that resources were focused on fewer cases, so even 
though the range of interventions available was somewhat less, the overall service 
input per case was higher, which may help explain the difference in offending trends.  
 
In short, the verdict from the evaluation on the effectiveness of Fast Track is 
definitely positive with regard to time-scales and other aspects such as assessment and 
action plans, but not proven with regard to impact on offending. 
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